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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930344-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Attempted Fraudulent Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a 
Drug Free Zone, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. 
Burningham, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel 
as required under the sixth amendment? When considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct 
appeal, this Court should decide the issue as a matter of law. 
State v. Cosev, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(7) (1994) 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit 
any offense unlawful under this chapter is upon 
conviction guilty of one degree less that the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Attempted Fraudulent 
Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (a) (ii) 
and 58-37-8(5) (1994) (R. 1). Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted as charged in the information (R. 167). The trial 
court entered judgment for a second degree felony conviction and 
sentenced defendant to a term of one to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 192). Defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 
200) . 
While his case was pending on appeal, defendant filed a 
motion for correction of an illegal sentence in district court. 
Defendant argued there, as he was arguing on appeal, that he was 
incorrectly charged with a second degree felony instead of a 
third degree felony (R. 238-43). Defendant requested, and this 
Court granted, a stay of the proceedings on appeal pending a 
resolution of his motion to correct an illegal sentence (R. 244). 
This Court therefore temporarily remanded the case to the trial 
court for consideration of defendant's motion (id.). 
On remand, the trial court that because defendant was 
convicted only of attempted fraudulent obtaining of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, he was entitled to have the degree 
of conviction reduced by one degree to a third degree felony (R. 
250-52). See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(7) (1994). The trial 
court therefore granted defendant's motion and reduced the degree 
of conviction to a third degree felony and amended his 
2 
accordingly (R. 249). 
Having had his illegal sentence corrected, defendant 
filed a supplemental brief on appeal that he asked this Court to 
view as a "replacement brief" because the issues on appeal had 
been altered. Br. of Appellant at 5. The State therefore 
responds to the claims raised in defendant's "supplemental 
brief." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On August 8, 1992, Lawrence Groneman, a pharmacy 
director at Edgemont Pharmacy in Provo, was working with 
technicians Jody Kirk and Barbara Mendenhall (R. 225 at 91). At 
approximately 4 p.m. an individual claiming to be Dr. Scott 
Hansen called in a prescription for Vicodin (a schedule three 
controlled substance) for Ken Wilson (R. 225 at 93-94, 159) . 
Groneman was suspicious and decided to call the doctor at home to 
verify the prescription (R. 225 at 94-95). Dr. Hansen told 
Groneman that he had not called in the prescription and said he 
could not recall a patient named Ken Wilson (R. 225 at 95-96, 
158) . 
Groneman called the police and informed the pharmacy 
technicians of the problem. When defendant attempted to pick up 
the Vicodin, Groneman tried unsuccessfully to detain him (R. 225 
at 97-98, 132, 225) . Defendant left the pharmacy, but he was 
soon apprehended by police (R. 225 at 104, 136, 170, 196, 241). 
1
 The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989); State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). 
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After Groneman and Kirk identified defendant as the man who had 
attempted to pick up the Vicodin, defendant was arrested (R. 225 
at 104, 136, 173, 241). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that his counsel's alleged failure to 
recognize that defendant should have been charged with a third 
instead of a second degree felony prejudiced him during plea 
bargain negotiations is misplaced. The constitution guarantees a 
fair trial, not a fair plea bargain. Because defendant asserted 
his right to a jury trial, he is restricted to challenging the 
outcome of that trial, not the outcome of plea negotiations. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at trial. His ineffectiveness claims 
should therefore be rejected as mere speculation. 
Defendant should have been convicted of a second and 
not a third degree felony. That does not mean, however, that 
defendant was not properly charged. Under Utah law, the 
reduction in the degree of conviction to which defendant was 
entitled is made at the time judgment is entered, not at the time 
charges are filed. The improper judgment against defendant was 
amended to reflect a one degree reduction in his conviction. 
Defendant's claim that he was nonetheless prejudiced at trial is 
therefore misplaced because there was ample evidence to support 
his conviction. ARGUMENT 
Defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel. 
In order to demonstrate otherwise, defendant "must show (1) his 
4 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) there 
exists a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient 
conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant." State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), and State 
v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah App. 1989)). Accord 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
Here, defendant has failed to meet his burden under either of 
Strickland's two prongs. 
A. Defendant's Claim that be was Denied Effective 
Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiations is 
Misplaced. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "our state 
and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea 
bargains." State v. Gearv, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
Accordingly, the Court has "generally refused to oversee the 
bargaining process" in cases in which defendants convicted at 
trial allege that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 
negotiations. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 1988) 
(citing Geary, 707 P.2d at 646). Accord State v. Knight. 734 
P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, as in Geary, Colonna and Knight, 
defendant proceeded to trial. Having been convicted after a jury 
trial, defendant is restricted to challenging "the outcome of 
[his] trial, not the outcome of plea bargaining." Knight. 734 
P.2d at 919 n.7. To the extent defendant appears to argue that 
his trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, this 
5 
Court should reject defendant's claim as inconsistent with Geary, 
Colonna and Knight.2 
B. Defendant has Failed to Allege Any Specific 
Incidents of Inadequate Performance by his Counsel 
at Trial. 
Defendant's claim that the outcome of his trial would 
have been different had it not been for counsel's alleged 
inadequate performance should be rejected as mere speculation. 
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 62 (Utah 1993) ("Absent 
anything beyond mere speculation, [Utah courts] reject . . . 
ineffectiveness claim[s] for lack of prejudice."). 
Defendant has failed to identify specific instances of 
inadequate performance arising during his trial, let alone any 
prejudice flowing therefrom. Rather, defendant argues that his 
counsel's alleged failure to recognize that defendant was 
improperly charged with a second degree felony indicates that 
counsel's performance at trial must have likewise been 
substandard. As discussed below, the charge against defendant 
was correct, but the degree of conviction should have been 
reduced when judgment was entered. But even assuming defendant's 
2
 Defendant claims that the standard that applies to 
ineffectiveness claims arising from a guilty plea should apply to 
this case. In so doing, defendant relies on Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) (A defendant challenging a guilty plea 
on ineffectiveness grounds must prove that counsel's deficient 
performance "affected the outcome of the plea process."). That 
reliance is misplaced because the entry of a guilty plea requires 
the waiver of one's right to a jury trial. In this case, 
however, defendant asserted his right to a jury trial. Because 
there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain comparable to 
the right to a jury trial, Parsons is inapposite. Rather, this 
case is controlled by Geary, Colonna and Knight. 
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first proposition were true, the latter does not necessarily 
follow. Absent the identification of specific instances of 
inadequate performance and a demonstration of prejudice to 
defendant flowing therefrom, defendant's claim that he would have 
received a more favorable outcome at trial should be rejected as 
mere speculation. Id. 
C. Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate that his 
Having Been Charged with a Second Degree Felony 
Instead of a Third Degree Felony Prejudiced Him at 
Trial. 
Finally, defendant's claim that the trial court and his 
counsel failed to recognize that he was improperly charged with a 
second degree felony is misplaced. Under the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(7), the reduction in the degree of 
conviction for attempted offenses, as opposed to completed 
offenses, is made "upon conviction" -- not at the time charges 
are filed. Accordingly, defendant was properly charged with a 
second degree felony. It was at the time judgment was entered, 
not at the point the information was filed, at which the parties 
below should have recognized that defendant was guilty of a third 
degree felony instead of a second degree felony. That problem 
has been rectified because the trial court amended its judgment 
and resentenced defendant based on his conviction of a third 
degree felony. 
In any event, the evidence adduced at trial clearly 
supported defendant's conviction of attempted fraudulent 
obtaining of a controlled substance. Certainly, it cannot be 
said that defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that had 
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his offense been charged as a third degree felony instead of a 
second degree felony the outcome of his trial would likely have 
been different. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
summarily affirm defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
The facts and legal standards necessary for resolution 
of this appeal are adequately set forth in the briefs. Oral 
argument would therefore be of little benefit to this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fj/—day of February, 1995, 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
CUtA 
TODD A. UTZlNGI 
Assistant Attorney General 
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